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ARIZONA V. EVANS: EXPANDING
EXCLUSIONARY RULE EXCEPTIONS
AND CONTRACTING FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Evans,1

In Arizona v.
the United States Supreme Court held that
the exclusionary rule does not apply where an unlawful search is the
result of a clerical error by a court employee. 2 The Court reasoned
that the exclusionary rule did not fulfill its requisite deterrent purposes in a case where a police officer acted in good faith in response
to a non-existent misdemeanor warrant appearing on the police computer.3 Thus, the Court ruled that evidence seized in violation of
Isaac Evans' Fourth Amendment rights could be admitted and used
against Evans in a criminal proceeding.4 According to the Court, the
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to deter future Fourth Amendment violations by police officers. 5 Because the
rule is not a specific remedy to cure Fourth Amendment violations, it
is only applicable when the deterrent purposes are most efficaciously
6
served.
This Note argues that the illegally seized evidence should have
been excluded even though the violation was caused by a court employee. 7 First, this Note asserts that the Court distorted the precedent
of United States v. Leon,8 the common law foundation for the good
faith exception, by ignoring the centrality of the warrant process in
that case. Second, this Note asserts that, contrary to the majority's
indication, the role of the exclusionary rule is much greater than
mere deterrence. 9 Finally, this Note argues that even if the main goal
1 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
2 Id. at 1194.
3 Id. at 1191.
4 Id. at 1194.
5 Id. at 1191.
6 Id.

7 See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
8 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
9 This assertion is consistent with Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. See.Evans, 115 S.
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of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, that goal would be better served
by applying the rule to all state law enforcement personnel, not only
to arresting officers. Therefore, the Court incorrectly held that the
introduction of evidence against a criminal defendant, seized without
a warrant or probable cause due to clerical error, was constitutionally
permissible.
II. BACKGROUND
1.

Basic Principles of the FourthAmendment and the Exclusionary Rule

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the right of
the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 10
While the language of the Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable
searches and seizures, it does not provide a mechanism for prevention
or a remedy, should they occur." The exclusionary rule provides a
means for enforcing the Fourth Amendment by "command [ing] that
where evidence has been obtained in violation of the search and
seizure protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the illegally
12
obtained evidence can not be used at the trial of a defendant."
The Supreme Court first announced the exclusionary rule in
1886, in Boyd v. United States.13 Boyd involved a quasi-criminal forfeiture proceeding.' 4 In Boyd, the Court concluded that compelling a
defendant to produce private papers was equivalent to an unlawful
search and seizure and therefore unconstitutional. 15 Justice Bradley
authored the opinion which linked the Fourth and Fifth AmendCt. at 1195-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The full Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Id.
1 For a discussion of whether the text of the Fourth Amendment mandates suppression of illegally seized evidence, compare STEPHEN SCHLsINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICF
(1977) and Malcolm Richard Wilkey, The Exclusionavy Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidmce ?, 62
JUDICATURE 215 (1978), with the words of Justice Brennan: "many of the Constitution's
most vital imperatives are stated in general terms and the task of giving meaning to these
precepts is therefore left to subsequentjudicial decisionmaking in the context of concrete
cases." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 932 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For
example, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments are stated in general terms, setting forth rights to be interpreted and given "meaning" through judicial
interpretation.
12 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY

13 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
14 Id. at 633-34.
15 Id. at 634-35.

563 (6th ed. 1990).
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ments.' 6 Compelling the production of private papers essentially required the defendant to provide self-incriminating testimony, a clear
Fifth Amendment violation.' 7 Thus, the Court noted that because police often engage in unreasonable searches or seizures in order to
compel the defendant to give self-incriminating testimony, the admission of this evidence in court violates the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.' 8
In 1914, in Weeks v. United States,' 9 the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to criminal proceedings in federal courts.
In Weeks, the Court held that a trial court could not use private documents, such as letters, which were seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, as evidence in criminal proceedings.2 0 The Court reasoned that it could not admit illegally obtained evidence without effectively condoning unconstitutional behavior, thereby compromising
the integrity of the judiciary. 2 1 The Court did not mention deterrence as a goal supporting the exclusionary rule, but rather noted privacy interests, 22 the limitation of governmental power,2 3 and the
24
import of judicial integrity.
In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,2 5 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution mandated the exclusionary rule as a remedy of a Fourth
Amendment violation in state proceedings.2 6 The Mapp Court examined the foundation of the precedent of Wolf, which came to the
opposite conclusion,2 7 and ultimately ruled that the exclusionary rule
was an essential element of the guarantee of privacy embodied in the
Fourth Amendment, and was therefore required by the Due Process
28
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
16 Id. at 617, 633-35. The Fifth Amendment provides in part that "[n]o person shall...
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...." U.S. CONsr. amend.
V.
17 Id. at 634-35.

18 Id. at 633.

19 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20 Id. at 398.
21 Id. at 392.

22 Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 391-92 ("The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority.").
24 Id. at 394.
25 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which
dealt with the applicability of the exclusionary rule to the states. The Wo/f Court rejected
the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment forbid the admission of illegally obtained evidence in state court.
26 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-58.
27 See supra note 25.
28 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides in part that "[n]o State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
23
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The Mapp Court specified three purposes served by the exclusionary rule: constitutional privilege, 2 9 judicial integrity, 30 and deterrence.3 1 First, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule was a
constitutionally required privilege and that the Fourth Amendment
barred the use of illegally obtained evidence. 32 Second, the Court acknowledged that by admitting illegally obtained evidence, judges
would extend Fourth Amendment violations to the courtroom. 3
Such a judicially sanctioned admission of illegal evidence would undermine public regard for the integrity of the judiciary.3 4 Finally, by
eliminating any incentive for the police to violate the Fourth Amend35
ment, the exclusionary rule would deter future police misconduct.
2. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Since Mapp,3 6 the Supreme Court has repeatedly carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule, systematically ignoring all but the
deterrence rationale for the rule.3 7 Presently, there exist the following exceptions: the impeachment exception, the independent source
exception, the inevitable discovery exception, the good faith excep38
tion, the harmless error exception, and the rule of attenuation.
without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
29 Id. at 656 (stating that allowing illegally seized evidence to be admitted into court
would be "to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment").
50 Id. at 659-60.
3 Id. at 656.
32 Id. at 648.
33 Id. at 660.
34 Id. at 659.
35 Id. at 656.
36 For a discussion of basic Fourth Amendment principles, focusing primarily on Mapp,
see Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. Rav. 1365 (1983).
37 In addition to common law developments creating exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, statutory proposals currently under Congressional consideration threaten the rule.
The proposed Exclusionary Rule Reform Act would amend Title 18 of the United States
Code by adding the following provision:
Evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that the search or seizure was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, if the
search or seizure was carried out in circumstances justifring an objectively reasonable
belief that it was in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. The fact that evidence
was obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie
evidence of the existence of such circumstances.
H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). For a discussion of the proposed statutory
changes, see Stephen Chapman, When the Police Violate Your Rights, But Oh-So Reasonably,
CHi. TrUB., Feb. 12, 1995, at 3; Kenneth Jost, Exclusionary Rule Reforms Advance: Opponent
Claim Proposals Unconstitutional,Encourage Police Misconduct, 81 A.BA J. 18 (May 1995).
38 In addition to the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, limitations on standing to
assert a Fourth Amendment violation severely limit the rule. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978).
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The Impeachment Exception

In Walder v. United States,3 9 the Court established the "impeachment exception," allowing the Government to offer illegally seized evidence on cross examination of a criminal defendant to impeach the
defendant who has perjured herself on direct. 40 The trial judge in
Walder admitted evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment to prove that a defendant, who testified that she had never possessed, purchased, or sold any narcotic drugs, was lying.4 1 The Walder
Court held that to disallow evidence in such a case would be a "perversion of the Fourth Amendment."4 2 In other decisions, the Court has
held that a criminal defendant, while possessing a Constitutional right
to testify in her own defense, does not have a right to commit perjury,
and evidence procured in violation of the Constitution is nonetheless
43
admissible for impeachment purposes.
James v. Illinois4 limited the impeachment exception to the testimony of the criminal defendant. When a defense witness other than
the defendant perjures herself on the stand, the Government cannot
impeach with evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 4 5
2.

The Independent Source Exception

In Wong Sun v. United States,46 the Court established the "independent source" exception to the exclusionary rule. This exception inquires whether the evidence was discovered through an
exploitation of the Fourth Amendment violation or through an independent source "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."4 7 If the evidence is not obtained directly from the
violation, it is freed from the initial taint of the violation. 48 Theoreti39 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
40 Id. at 65.
41 Id. at 64.

Id. at 65.
43 See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 346 (1990) (statement obtained through violation of Sixth Amendment rights admissible for the purposes of impeachment after defendant provides false testimony); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975) (statement
given without Mirandawarning admissible after defendant gave contradicting testimony);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971) (defendant's statement in violation of
Mirandaallowed for impeachment).
44 493 U.S. 307 (1990). For a discussion of this case, see Kathleen M. Ghreichi, Note,
James v. Illinois:An Unexpected Departurefrom the Steady Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Exdusiona Ru , 22 U. Tot. L. RE,. 839 (1991).
45 James, 493 U.S. at 320.
46 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
42

47 Id. at 488 (quotingJOHN MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).

48 Id.
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cally, this exception prevents the government from benefitting from
misconduct, but avoids forcing the government into a worse position
than had no misconduct occurred. 49
The Court extended the independent source exception in United
States v. Segura,50 which allowed the admission of evidence in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Police officers had requested a warrant to
enter a home, but did not wait for the warrant.5 1 The state argued
that had the police waited, they would have received the warrant and
seized the evidence legally.52 The Court found that this "potential"
warrant provided them with an "independent source" for admitting
53
the evidence.
3. The Inevitable Discovery Exception
In 1984, the Court established the "inevitable discovery" exception in Nix v. Williams.54 The "inevitable discovery" rule permits the
admission of illegally seized evidence that would have inevitably been
discovered through lawful means.55 In enunciating this exception,
the Court used a balancing test, weighing the deterrence goals of the
exclusionary rule against the judicial interest in having the maximum
amount of probative evidence available. 56 The Court concluded that
the exclusion of illegal evidence that was inevitably discovered undermined the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule. 5 7 In such a

situation, societal interest in judicial truth-finding outweighs any po58
tential deterrent effects.
4.

The Good FaithException5 9

The "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule was estab49 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
50 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
51 Id. at 800-01.
52 Id. at 813-16.
53 Id. at 816. This extension of the "independent source" exception approaches the
"inevitable discovery" exception described below.
54 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
55 Id. at 441-44.
56 Id. at 443-44.
57 Id.
58 Id.

59 Despite the name, subjective good faith on the part of the officers alone is not
enough to invoke the exception. The good faith belief must be objectively reasonable.
The Leon Court itself cited circumstances in which behavior would be objectively
unreasonable, and therefore subjective good faith would be irrelevant:
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in
issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the afflant knew was
fUlse or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth.
The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases where the issuing
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lished in 1984 in United States v. Leon.60 Leon held that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule should not bar use, in the prosecution's case in chief, of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant later determined to be invalid.6 1 In
Leon, the police relied in good faith on a warrant and arrested the
defendant. 62 Although issued by a detached and neutral magistrate,
an appellate court ultimately invalidated the warrant. 63 Justice White,
writing for the Court, stressed that the exclusionary rule should be
64
applied flexibly in order to prevent public disrespect for the law.
Additionally, the purpose of the rule is to deter illegal acts specifically
of the police; excluding evidence obtained by a police officer's good
faith search which is illegal due to a judge's mistake would serve no
such deterrent purposes. 65 Suppression would be appropriate, however, when the officer has no reasonable ground for believing that the
66
warrant was legally issued.
The Leon Court considered three factors. First, the Court noted
that the historical purpose of the exclusionary rule was "to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors ofjudges and magistrates." 67 Second, the Court asserted that no evidence suggested that
judges or magistrates tend to ignore the Fourth Amendment, or that
their behavior requires deterrent sanctions. 6 8 Third, the Court contended that the exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to such a warrant would not have a deterrent effect on the issuing judge or
magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role....

Nor would an officer manifest

objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.'
Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so
facially deficient-i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things
to be seized-that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (citations omitted). See also People v.
Machupa, 872 P.2d 114, 115 n.1 (Cal. 1994).
60 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See also Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (companion case to Leon; holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when ajudge failed
to make necessary clerical corrections to a defective warrant, resulting in an illegal search
made by the police in good faith); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (holding that
police reliance on a statute is objectively reasonable, and therefore exempt from the exclusionary rule, although the statute was ultimately found to be unconstitutional).
61 Leon,
affidavit on
904.
62 Id. at
63 Id. at
64 Id. at
65 Id. at
66 Id. at
67 Id. at
68 Id.

468 U.S. at 900. The search warrant was later held to be invalid because the
which the warrant was based was insufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at
902.
902-04.
907.
916-17.
922-23.
916.
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magistrate due to judicial independence. 6 9 The Court concluded that
suppression was inappropriate because the officers involved had no
70
grounds for believing that the warrant was improperly issued.
5.

The Harmless ErrorException7 1

The Court established the harmless error exception in Chapman
v. California.7 2 The harmless error exception focuses on the factual
determination of guilt rather than on peripheral and immaterial issues.7 - Thus, evidence admitted in violation of the Fourth Amend-

ment is subject to the doctrine of "harmless error."74 The doctrine
states that if admission of the evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction
will stand.75
Chapman dealt with murder convictions in a California court in
which the defendants chose not to testify in their defense. 76 In closing argument, the prosecution commented at length on the defendants' failure to testify.7 7 After the trials, but before the case reached

the California Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court held
that Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, which provided that the prosecutor could comment on a defendant's failure to
testify, was in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against
compelled self-incrimination. 78 The California Supreme Court up69 Id.
70 Id. at 922-23.
71 This is not a true "exception" to the exclusionary rule. Rather, this rule governs
reversal of convictions obtained through the use of illegally obtained evidence. Whenever
illegally seized evidence is used in a trial, reversal is not automatic, but only upon a
showing of prejudice. The harmless error doctrine as applied to federal constitutional
provisions must be distinguished from non-constitutional error. Non-constitutional error
is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provide "[a]ny error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED.
R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
72 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
73 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). See aLso Harrington v. California,
395 U.S. 250 (1969).
74 See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,372 (1972). The harmless error doctrine also
applies to Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations.
75 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967) ("[Tjhere may be some constitutional errors in a setting of a particular case [that] are so unimportant and insignificant
that they may, consistent with the federal constitution, be deemed harmless.").
76 Id. at 19.

77 Id. At the time, Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provided that "in
any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny
by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by
the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or thejury." CAL. CONST. of
1967 art. I § 13.
78 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).
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held the conviction despite the Griffin decision, citing the California
Constitution's harmless error provision. 79 In appealing to the United
States Supreme Court, petitioners argued both that violations of the
Griffin decision could never be considered harmless, and that, given
the specific facts of this case, they were not harmless to petitioners. 80
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that (1) the Supreme
Court had jurisdiction to create a harmless error rule;8 1 (2) in order
to hold a Constitutional error harmless, a court must find it harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt;8 2 and (3) given the specific facts of this

case, the defendants prevailed by showing that the comments of the
prosecutor reasonably could have contributed to the petitioners' convictions.8 3 The harmless error doctrine effectively eliminates any potential remedy in the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment
violation when the prosecutor proves that admission of the illegally
seized evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
6.

The Rule of Attenuation

Finally, the Court established the "rule of attenuation," in Nardone v. United States.84 The rule of attenuation allows a court to admit
illegally seized evidence when the Fourth Amendment violation is sufficiently far from the discovery of the evidence as to "dissipate the
taint."85 Either time or some intervening event can sufficiently separate the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation from the illegal procurement of evidence. n Brown v. Illinois8 7 enumerated three factors
relevant to the determination of whether the rule of attenuation applies: "(1) the length of time between the illegality and the seizure of
evidence; (2) the presence of additional intervening factors; and (3)
the degree and purpose of the official misconduct."88 The Brown
Court found that the rule of attenuation did not go so far as to dissipate the taint for the facts in this particular case because less than two
hours separated the violation from the evidence, there was no intervening event of any insignificance whatsoever 9 and "the impropriety
of the arrest was obvious." 90
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

See People v. Teale, 404 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1965).
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24-26.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21-24.
Id. at 24-26.
308 U.S. 338 (1939).
Id. at 341.
Id.
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 605.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

OnJanuary 5, 1991, Isaac Evans took a wrong turn onto a one-way
street.91 The wrong turn occurred in front of a Phoenix police station.92 Officer Bryan Sargent and his partner were in front of the
station and observed Evans' illegal activity.9 3 Officer Sargent pulled
Evans over and asked for his license. 94 Evans informed Sargent that
his license had been suspended. 95 Officer Sargent entered Evans'
name into a computer data terminal in his patrol car, which revealed
an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for Evans' arrest. 96 Based on
this warrant, Officer Sargent arrested Evans. 97 While being handcuffed, Evans dropped a cigarette which the officers determined
smelled of marijuana.98 Sargent searched Evans' car and found a bag
of marijuana under the front passenger's seat.99
Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, a class six fel10
ony. 0 When police notified the justice court of Evans' arrest, a court
employee discovered that the arrest warrant had previously been
quashed and so advised the police.1 0 1
Evans filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized in conjunction with the January 5th arrest, claiming that he was a victim of an
illegal search. 0 2 The state responded that the arresting officer acted
on a good faith belief that a warrant existed, and that use of the evidence should be permitted pursuant to Arizona's good faith
0
statute.'

3

91 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1188 (1995).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.

96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), reuld, 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz.

1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
101 Brief for the Respondent, Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660).
102 Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025.
103 Id. at 1026. The Arizona good faith exception provides:

A. If a party in a criminal proceeding seeks to exclude evidence from the trier of fact
because of the conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the evidence, the proponent of
the evidence may urge that the peace officer's conduct was taken in a reasonable,
good faith belief that the conduct was proper and that the evidence discovered should
not be kept from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible.
B. The trial court shall not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer
as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation.
C. In this section:
1. "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.
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At the suppression hearing, the chief clerk of the justice court
testified that on December 13, 1990, ajustice of the peace in Phoenix
issued a warrant for Evans' arrest because he failed to appear on the
previous day to respond to several traffic violations.10 4 However, on
December 19, Evans appeared before ajudge pro tempore who quashed
the warrant. 10 5 Evans asserted that because his arrest and subsequent
search were based on a warrant that had been quashed prior to the
arrest, the court should exclude all seized evidence as a product of an
06
illegal search and seizure.'
After testifying at the suppression hearing that Evans'
outstanding warrant had been quashed prior to his arrest, the justice court
clerk described the usual procedures for quashing a warrant. 107 First,
a clerk at the justice court informs the warrant section of the sheriff's
office that the warrant has been quashed.' 0 8 Then, a sheriffs office
employee removes the warrant from the computer records.' 0 9 Finally,
the justice court clerk makes a notation in the file indicating that he
or she made such a phone call, and notes the name of the sheriff's
office employee who received the information. 110 The chief clerk testified that Evans' file contained no indication that a clerk had called
and notified the sheriffs office that Evans' arrest warrant had been
quashed."' The records clerk from the sheriffs office also testified
that her office had no record of a phone call informing them that the
12
warrant had been quashed.
After hearing the clerks' testimonies, the trial court granted Evans' motion'to suppress, concluding that the State had been at fault
for failing to properly quash the warrant.1 3 The court did not make a
determination as to who was ultimately responsible for the continued
presence of the quashed warrant in the police computer, 114 noting
that there was no "distinction between State action, whether it hap2. "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon:
(a) A statute which is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.
(b) A warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake.
(c) A controlling court precedent which is later overruled, unless the court overruling
the precedent orders the new precedent to be applied retroactively.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3925 (1993).
104 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185,

105 Id.
106 Id.
107

Id.

108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.

I Id.
112
"13
"14

Id.
Id.
Id.

1188 (1995).
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pens to be the police department or not."115
The state appealed the trial court's ruling to the Arizona Court of
Appeals.116 A divided panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals held that
the trial court abused its discretion in granting Evans' motion to suppress.'1 7 The court reasoned that excluding evidence in such a case
would not serve the exclusionary rule's primary purpose of deterrence: "the exclusionary rule [was] not intended to deterjustice court
employees or Sheriff's Office employees who are not directly associated with the arresting officers or the arresting officers' police
department."" 8
Evans then appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the suppression the evidence." 9 The court found no "distinction drawn . . .
between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and
similar mistakes by court employees." 120 A broad application of the
exclusionary rule, the court stated, would "hopefully serve to improve
the efficiency of those who keep records in [the] criminal justice system."' 2 ' Finally, the court focused on the broader implications for
the exclusionary rule for individual freedom from government intrusion, stating that "it is repugnant to the principles of a free society that
a person should ever be taken into police custody because of a computer error precipitated by government carelessness; ... under those
circumstances, the exclusionary rule is a 'cost' we cannot afford to be
22
without."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized incident to
an arrest warrant resulting from an inaccurate computer record, regardless of whether police or court personnel were responsible for the
23
record's continued presence in the police computer.

"15 Id.
116 State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), rev', 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
117 Id. at 1024.

118 Id. at 1027.

119 State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
120 Id. at 871.
121 Id. at 872.
122

Id.

114 S. C. 2131 (1994). This is how Chief Justice Rehnquist framed the issue involved, Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189, although at most times during the opinions, the courts
seemed to assume that the error was caused by the court clerk rather than the sheriff's
office. See, e.g., id. at 1193 ("If it were indeed a court clerk who was responsible .... .").
123
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THE MAJORITY OPINION

Writing for the majority, 124 Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed the
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court. First, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review
all decisions of the highest state court where it is unclear whether the
grounds for the decision are state or federal law and no "plain statement" disavowing interpretation of federal law exists.1 25 Second,
Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the exclusionary rule does
not require suppression of evidence seized during an unlawful arrest
that resulted from a clerical error of either a court employee or a
126
sheriff's office employee.
1. Jurisdiction 27
As a threshold matter, ChiefJustice Rehnquist rejected Evans' argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction 28 because the Arizona
124 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Breyerjoined in ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion.
125 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1190.
126 Id. at 1194.
127 The focus of this Note is the exclusionary rule, although a different resolution of the
jurisdictional issue, namely that proposed by Justice Ginsburg, would dispose of the
substantive Fourth Amendment discussion. For information on thejurisdictional issue, see
MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENsIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
260-79 (1991); CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 107, at 745 (4th
ed. 1983); Thomas E. Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in
Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. R. 799 (1985); Scott H. Bice,
Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750 (1972); Larry M. Elison &
Dennis NettikSimmons, Federal and State Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent and
Adequate State Grounds, 45 MONT. L. REv. 177 (1984); Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State
Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1965); Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural
Common Law, FederalJurisdictionalPolicy, and the Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent
State GroundsDoctrine, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 1291 (1986); David A. SchlueterJudialFederalism
and Supreme CourtReview of State CourtDecisions:A SensibleBalanceEmerges, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1079 (1984); Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequateand Dependent "Adequateand Independent
State Grounds" Doctrine, 18 HAsTINS CONST. L. Q. 371 (1991); Richard A. Seid, Schizoid
Federalism, Supreme Court Power, and Inadequate State Ground Theory: Michigan v. Long, 18
CREIGHTON L Ray. 1 (1984); Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalRelationship
Between State and FederalCourts: A Critiqueof Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. Rr'v. 1118
(1984); Comment, Michigan v. Long: PresumptiveFederalAppellateJurisdictionover State Cases
ContainingAmbiguousGrounds ofDecisions, 69 IowA L. REV. 1081 (1984); Note, The Untenable
Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARv. L. RE%% 1375 (1961).
128 The statute regarding Supreme Courtjurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994), provides
as follows:
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or
where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where
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Supreme Court based its decision on the Arizona good faith exception statute129 rather than federal law.' 30 Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited Michigan v. Long,'3 ' which adopted the following standard for
determining whether a state court decision is based on sufficient state
law grounds to preclude Supreme Court review:
[when] a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal
law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and when the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face
of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that
the state court decided the case the
way it did because it believed that
2
federal law required it to do so. 13
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Long standard was
adopted for two reasons. First, it prevents the Supreme Court from
requiring state courts to clarify the foundation for their decisions on
remand.' 3 3 Second, this standard protects the integrity of federal law,
while allowing states to develop independent jurisprudence free from
federal involvement. 3 4 Responding to Justice Ginsburg's criticism
that the Long standard limits the states' ability to create and implement unique jurisprudence, 3 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that
state courts are free to afford greater protection to individual rights
under state constitutions than are provided by their federal counterpart, but when interpreting federal law, state courts must be subject to
the Supreme Court's authority. 136
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Arizona Supreme
Court's discussion of the exclusionary rule, absent a disclaimer that
the Court was using federal law for guidance only, clearly subjected
137
the decision to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
2.

Substantive Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule

After determining that the Court had jurisdiction, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is inappropriate when the Fourth Amendment violation
results from a clerical error by a court employee, a sheriff's office emany title, right, privilege, or immunity is specifically set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States.
129 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (1993).
130 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1189 (1995).

131 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41).
133 Id. at 1189 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1041).
132

134 Id.

135 Id. at 1198 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 1190.
137 Id.
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ployee, or a police department employee.' 3 8
First, ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that the exclusionary rule is
ajudicially created remedy, whose purpose is to prevent future Fourth
Amendment violations, rather than to provide an individual remedy.' 3 9 Because the language of the Fourth Amendment does not
mandate the exclusionary rule, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
no connection exists between a Fourth Amendment violation and an
individual's right to the suppression of evidence. 140
Second, citing United States v. Leon,141 ChiefJustice Rehnquist asserted that the exclusionary rule should only be applied when its deterrent purpose is advanced. 142 Applying the Leon reasoning to the
facts in Evans, ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that excluding evidence
improperly obtained due to a court clerk's departure from established
office practices would serve no deterrent purposes. 143 Chief Justice
Rehnquist maintained that, unlike police officers, court employees
are not directly involved in law enforcement and have no personal or
professional stake in the outcome of prosecutions. 4 4 Because the application of the exclusionary rule in the circumstances particular to
Evans does not deter misconduct, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded
that suppression of evidence was an inappropriate remedy. 145
B.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE

Justice O'Connor'4 6 wrote separately to underline her interpretation of the decision's limited scope. Justice O'Connor balanced the
burden on law enforcement capabilities imposed by the exclusionary
rule against the necessity for deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. 14 7 Justice O'Connor emphasized the reasonable reliance standard as the basis for determining whether the exclusionary rule is
applicable.' 48 Concluding that "with the benefits of more efficient law
enforcement mechanisms comes the burden of corresponding constitutional responsibilities," Justice O'Connor left open the question as
to whether the police officers' reliance on the record-keeping system
138 Id. at 1193.
139 Id. at 1191.
140

Id.

141 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
142 Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1191.
143 Id.at 1193.
144

Id.;
see also Leon, 486 U.S. at 916.

145 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194.

Justices Souter and BreyerjoinedJustice O'Connor's concurrence.
147 Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148 Id.(O'Connor, J., concurring).
146

1216

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

itself was reasonable.

49

C.

[Vol. 86

JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Souter' 50 embraced Justice O'Connor's focus on the limited scope of the majority's holding in a one paragraph concurrence.15 ' Justice Souter suggested that the following important
question was left unanswered by the majority:
how far, in dealing with the fruits of computerized error, [should] our
very concept of deterrence by exclusion of evidence ... extend to the
government as a whole, not merely the police, on the ground that there
of
would otherwise be no reasonable expectation of keeping the number
2
resulting false arrests within an acceptable minimum limit[?]

D.

15

JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT

Joining Justice Ginsburg in her rejection of Michigan v. Long,Justice Stevens wrote separately to discuss the substantive Fourth Amendment issues presented by the exclusionary rule. 5 3 His analysis
consisted of four main points.
First, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's assertion that the limited objective of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct. 154 Throughout his opinion, Justice Stevens offered an
alternative focus on the individual's freedom from unreasonable and
arbitrary intrusion by any governmental entity, arguing that the suppression of illegally obtained evidence is the price "the sovereign"
must pay for Fourth Amendment violations.' 55
Second, Justice Stevens concluded that even if deterrence were
the sole rationale behind the exclusionary rule, the majority's holding
was incorrect on the merits. 15 6 Justice Stevens rejected the Court's
reliance on Leon, distinguishing a quashed warrant, one that no
longer exists, from a presumptively valid warrant that is later over15 7
turned on appeal.
Third, Justice Stevens maintained that the Leon exclusionary rule
would, in fact, effectively deter police misconduct under the present
circumstances because "law enforcement officials. . . stand in the best
position to monitor such errors as occurred here [and] can influence
149 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150 Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter's concurrence.
151 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Souter,J., concurring).
152 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
153 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 1195-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 1196 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

1996]

EXCLUSIONARY RULE

1217

mundane communication procedures in order to prevent those
1 58
errors."
Finally,Justice Stevens turned to the practical aspects of advanced
technology and its invasive impact on the autonomy of innocent citizens, concluding that "the cost [of lower rates of criminal prosecutions] is amply offset by an appropriately jealous regard for
maintaining the integrity of individual rights."' 5 9
E.

JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT

Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsburg 160 rejected the Long standard
for determining whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
state court decisions. 61' Justice Ginsburg proposed the adoption of
the opposite presumption, namely that "absent a plain statement to
the contrary... a state court's decision of the kind here at issue rests
on an independent state law ground."' 6 2 Justice Ginsburg maintained
that this rule would free the states to act as "laboratories" in response
to novel legal problems. 163 Therefore, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.'6
Justice Ginsburg responded peripherally to the substantive issues
by identifying the problems associated with increasingly invasive technology, discussing the artificiality of the distinction between court personnel and police officers, and recognizing that deterrence is an
empirical question rather than a purely logical exercise.' 6 5 Justice

Ginsburg proposed that the federal judiciary should allow state courts
a freer rein to explore new ground and to protect individual rights
66
against state infringement
V.

ANALYSIS

This Note argues that the Court erred in its substantive conclusion that courts should not apply the exclusionary rule when a court
employee makes a clerical error resulting in a Fourth Amendment violation. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the
rights of all citizens against illegal searches and seizures by the govern158 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'59 Id. at 1197 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647
(1961)).

160 Justice Stevens joined justice Ginsburg in her dissent.
161 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1198 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
162 Id. at 1199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

163
164
165
166

Id. at 1198 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1197-1203 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1201 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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ment.167 However, through the ever-increasing number of exceptions
to the exclusionary rule, 168 the Court has narrowed Constitutional
protections in privacy expectations, while expanding the authority of
the sovereign to intrude into an individual's life.
In Evans, the Court furthered this erosion by expanding the good
faith exception created in United States v. Leon. This Note asserts that
the Court's decision in Evans is wrong for three reasons. First, by ignoring the factual underpinnings of the precedent in Leon, the Court
disregarded the historical importance of judicial independence provided by the warrant process. Second, the Court focused on deterrence as the sole purpose advanced by the exclusionary rule, thereby
underestimating the value of the rule for other non-deterrent purposes. Finally, the Court drew an illogical "bright line" by effectively
limiting the deterrence possibilities of the exclusionary rule to arresting police officers. Therefore, the Court should have upheld the decision of the trial court to suppress the illegally seized evidence, as
affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court.
A.

EXTENDING THE LEON REASONING TO THE EVANS FACTS IGNORES
ESSENTIAL FACTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO CASES

The exceptions to the exclusionary rule are of two general types:
(1) those which recognize that evidence could have or did come from
a source other than the Fourth Amendment violation;1 69 and (2)
those which recognize independent legal reasons for allowing the evidence. 170 The so-called "good faith exception" recognized in Leon is
sui generis, a unique exception, based upon the independence of the
judicial warrant. 171 Because no warrant existed at the time of the
arrest in Evans, the Court misapplied the Leon holding. Although the
facts of Leon and Evans appear similar, the difference in the bases for
the illegal arrest in the two cases are fatal to the application of Leon's
reasoning to Evans.
amend. IV.
168 Current exceptions to the exclusionary rule are the following: the impeachment
167 U.S. CONST.

exception, the independent source exception, the inevitable discovery exception, the
"good faith" exception, the harmless error exception, and the rule of attenuation. See
supra notes 39-90 and accompanying text.
169 The independent source exception, the inevitable discovery exception, and the rule
of attenuation all admit evidence because it either did or could have come from a source

other than the violation.
170 The impeachment exception allows the illegally seized evidence to be admitted for
independent legal significance, namely to impeach a wimess. The harmless error exception simply refuses to overturn a lower court decision when a reviewing court determines
that the enforcement of constitutionally protected rights and attendant exclusion of evidence would not have made a difference.
171 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-18 (1984).
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In Leon, police officers conducted a legal search, acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached
and neutral magistrate. 172 The warrant was later determined to be
invalid. 173 In stark contrast, Evans' search and arrest was warrantless
and without probable cause. The basis for Evans' arrest, the "phantom warrant," existed only in the police computer at the time of the
illegal search and subsequent arrest.17 4 The warrant had clearly been
quashed'days earlier. 175
In Leon, there was a clear and legal authorization for the
search. 17 6 When issued by a judge or magistrate, a warrant is presumptively valid until found to be invalid. 17 7 After the judicial decision issuing Leon's warrant, all judicial and law enforcement
personnel fulfilled their respective responsibilities in effectuating the
arrest. 178 In contrast, the search in Evans occurred because accountable non-judicial government employees failed to complete their required tasks. 179 The warrantless search and seizure were not the result
of judicial error, but rather of a failure to effectuate a judicial
mandate. 180

Although the factual difference between Leon and Evans may appear somewhat technical,' 8 ' the distinction is crucial. As Justice
O'Connor stated in her dissent in Illinois v. Krull,18 2 "Leon simply instructs courts that police officers may rely upon a facially valid search
warrant."18 3 What they may not do-at least prior to Evans-is make a
warrantless arrest or conduct a warrantless search without probable
184
cause in reliance on a mere report that a warrant exists.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis ignores the focus of Leon,
172

Id. at 900.

173 Id. at 903-04.
174 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1188 (1995).

Id.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 902.
177 Id. at 926.
178 Id. at 902.
179 Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1188.
175
176

180 Id.

181 Both situations involve the arresting officers doing their jobs, acting in reasonable
reliance on what appears to be an arrest warrant.
182 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
183 Id. at 367 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184 See infranote 223. Consequences of the Evans decision are potentially far-reaching.
Evans would seem to validate searches or seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment:
where a clerk, either ajudicial employee or in a police office, pulls an incorrect file; when
a clerk types an incorrect license plate number into a computer; when one individual is
mistakenly searched and arrested due to mistaken identity based on a shared name. What
becomes clear through a consequentialist approach to Evans is that, after this case, only an
arresting officer, a small piece of a much larger puzzle, has a clear incentive to be careful
when it comes to the Fourth Amendment.
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namely, judicial independence in the context of the court's warrantissuing function. 185 Traditionally, courts prefer that arrests be made
pursuant to warrants issued by independent and unbiased magistrates,
rather than police officers' determination of probable cause.' 8 6 Congress established a procedure whereby police officers seek a neutral
judge's or magistrate's determination as to whether probable cause
for a search or seizure exists. 187 The clear purpose served by this procedure for obtaining a warrant, as described in United States v. Chadwick, 188 is that it "provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral
magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper
searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'en' 9
gaged in the often competitive process of ferreting out crime."
The neutrality and reliability inherent in the warrant process, when
compared to the police officer's determination of probable cause, create the presumption of validity of judicial warrants. 9 0
The Leon exception recognizes the importance of an independent determination of probable cause. 19 1 In this vein, the good faith
exception promotes the use of the warrant process, as the exception
provides police officers with an incentive for seeking a warrant
through a judge. The police disfavor the warrant process due to the
attendant time and energy requirements associated with going into
court and presenting evidence to a judge, who may or may not find
probable cause to exist. 192 However, the Leon exception provides that
185 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-15 (1984); 1 WAYNE F. LAFAvW, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 1.3(f)-(g)

(3d ed. 1996):

The reasoning which was critical to the decisions in those two cases [Leon and Shep-

pard]i-especially that in with-warrant cases there is no need to deter the magistrate
and usually no need to discourage the executing officer from relying upon the magistrate's judgment and actions-does not carry over to the without warrant situation.
Moreover, to extend Leon and Sheppard to such situations would deprive those decisions of their one clear incidental benefit: if good faith suffices only when the police
had a warrant, then the exception would 'give law enforcement officers some solid
encouragement to employ the warrant process for all searches and arrests which are
not made on an emergency basis.'
Id. § 1.3(g), at 94 (citation omitted).
186 The Supreme Court has noted the preference for warrants on many occasions. See,
e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236
(1983); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1977); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
187 "A warrant shall issue [i]f the... judge is satisfied that grounds for the application
exist or that there is probable cause to believe they exist." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
188 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
189 Id. at 9 (quotingJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
190 Leon, 468 U.S. at 914. Despite the fact that warrants are presumptively valid, circumstances exist in which it is unreasonable for a police officer to rely upon a warrant, and
therefore the exclusionary rule applies. See supra note 59.
191 Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.
192 See Chapman, supra note 37.
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a trial court will not exclude evidence on the basis of judicial error
when a judge's error results in a Fourth Amendment violation. Police
are thereby "rewarded" if they follow the warrant procedure; even if
an appellate court reviewing the probable cause determination finds
that probable cause did not, in fact, exist, police efforts are not wasted
as evidence is nonetheless admitted in the trial court. 93 In contrast,
when a police officer errs in determining that probable cause exists,
the exclusionary rule prohibits any evidence seized in connection
therewith from being admitted in court.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist ignores the obvious analogy of the quashing of Evans' warrant to the initial issuance of Leon's warrant-both
are presumptively valid because undertaken by a detached and neutral judicial official. Under Leon, the importance ofjudicial independence requires officers to accept on face value the validity ofjudicial
determinations and rewards them for doing so by refusing to secondguess the reliance thereon. The Evans actors fail to carry out the judicial directive quashing the warrant. Contrary to Leon, however, they
are subsequently "rewarded" through the admission of the illegally
seized evidence, which ultimately resulted in a conviction. ChiefJustice Rehnquist ignores the obvious distinction: the Evans problem occurs due to post-judicial error, while the Leon problem is due to
judicial error. This distinction is essential to the legal application of
Leon to the Evans facts, as well as to a common sense understanding of
the cases, after Leon's focus on judicial independence.
B.

EVANS IGNORES HISTORIC FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES AND
PURPOSES TO BE SERVED BY THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, INCLUDING
LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER, PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL
PRIVACY, AND PRESERVATION OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY

Despite the contentions of the majority, the exclusionary rule's
purposes reach beyond deterrence. 194 Other rationales, specifically
the constraint on the sovereign, protection of individual privacy, and
preservation of judicial integrity, were first introduced by Weeks and
remain vital and relevant 95 despite the fact that deterrence appears
193 Id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.
194 If deterrence is cited as the sole rationale for the exclusionary rule, the Leon "good

faith exception" becomes problematic. Professor Steven Schlesinger, an opponent of the
exclusionary rule, proposes that the good faith exception fosters "a careless attitude toward
detail on the part of law enforcement officials," encouraging "police to see what can be
gotten away with." Steven Schlesinger, It Is Time to Abolish the ExdusionarjRut4 WALL ST.J.,
Sept. 10, 1981, at A24.

195 It may appear paradoxical to say that interests are "vital and relevant" today when
recently the Court has consistently ignored these interests in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) and United States v. Leon,
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to be the sole rationale cited in support of the exclusionary rule
196
today.
First, the Fourth Amendment is "a constraint on the power of the
sovereign, not merely on some of its agents. The remedy for its violation imposes costs on that sovereign, motivating it to train all of its
personnel to avoid future violations.'

97

To give such a constraint

some "teeth," and to provide this motivation, the Fourth Amendment
must have a practical everyday meaning.19 8 The state must have some
incentive to control itself, particularly because individual actors often
have personal motivations in conflict with Fourth Amendment
compliance.199
Second, the exclusionary rule embodies the intertwined values of
privacy O and protection from government intervention which are
fundamental to a democracy. The majority's claim that the exclusionary rule is not a specific or guaranteed remedy to a Fourth Amendment violation is rebutted by the fact that individual privacy and
protection from government intervention remains fundamental on an
individual basis. Adversaries of the exclusionary rule argue for the
limitation of the rule because it protects criminals; 20 1 however, the
468 U.S. 897 (1984). However, privacy, the limitation of big government, individualized
justice, and government within (as opposed to above) the law remain at the forefront of
the concerns of many Americans.
196 For a discussion of the contrast between the purposes and goals of the exclusionary
rule cited by the Weeks Court and those cited in later decisions, see LAFAvE, supranote 185,
§ 1.3(b).
197 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (StevensJ, dissenting) (citations omitted).
198 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) ("The effect of the
Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the
exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of
such power and authority.")
199 Court and sheriffs office employees whose jobs are the result of political patronage
have a clear conflict between personal motivations to convict and compliance with the
Fourth Amendment. Such an individual would have a vested interest in the outcome of
criminal prosecutions when the elected official who appointed the employee is responsible
to her electorate on issues of crime. In such a case, if the public feels that the elected
official and her staff are not doing an adequate job prosecuting criminals, and the public
does not reelect the official, the appointed employee loses her job.
200 See, e.g. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390 ("Resistance to these practices [illegal searches and
seizures] had established the principle which was enacted into the fundamental law in the
Fourth Amendment, that a man's house was his castle and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.").
201 Studies show that the actual societal cost of the exclusionary rule is relatively small.
The cumulative loss in felony cases attributable to Fourth Amendment violations and the
subsequent exclusion of evidence is between .6% and 2.35%. Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard
Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ
Study and OtherStudies of "Lost"Arrests, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. REs.J. 611, 622 (1983). See also
KATHLEEN B. BROSI, A CROss-CITy COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING (1979); FLOYD
FEENEY ET AL., ARRESTS WITHOUT CoNvIcrIoN:

Institute ofJustice 1983);

How
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only means of providing protection from unlawful searches and
seizures is to do So for all people, including criminals. 20 2 There is
"nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few to protect the privacy of us all." 20 3 The
Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged the individual nature of the
Fourth Amendment violation, implicitly emphasizing that the remedy
should aim to preserve the core personal value of privacy: "[i ] t is repugnant to the principles of a free society that a person should ever
be taken into police custody because of a computer error precipitated
by government carelessness." 20 4 Justice Stevens similarly focused on
the indignity to the individual "[t] he offense to the dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate
20 5
computer data base strikes me as... outrageous."
The third purpose of the exclusionary rule is to prevent the judiciary from engaging in behavior violative of the Constitution. 20 6 As
discussed in Mapp, the admission of evidence seized pursuant to a
constitutional violation implicates the judiciary in the illicit conduct of
both the initial unlawful police activity and the secondary act of condoning such illegality through its admission in the trial court.20 7 The
ARY RuLE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (1983); Chapman, supra note 37; Peter F. Nardulli, The
Societal Cost of the ExclusionayRule: An EmpiricalAssessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 585
(1983); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical
Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. Ruv. 1016 (1987); Schlesinger, supra note
194.
202 The obvious difficulty inherent in this argument is the fact that most individuals
tangibly "harmed" by an illegal search or seizure are engaging in illegal behavior.
Criminals benefit most directly from the exclusionary rule. In creating the rule, the judiciary weighed public policy interests in keeping criminals off the street against protecting
innocent citizens from privacy violations. The clear effect of the exclusionary rule was
is better, so the Fourth Amendment
known to all judges, and the response was clear "[ilt
teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest."
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959). If, however, the purpose of the line of
exclusionary rule decisions ending with Evans is to alter this calculus, placing greater
weight on catching criminals, assuming we believe that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, a more appropriate route would be to rethink the exclusionary rule
as a remedy altogether, rather than chipping away at it through an ever-increasing number
of exclusions. For a discussion of the benefits of eliminating the exclusionary rule, see
Christine M. D'Elia, Comment, The Exclusionary Rule: Who Does It Punish?, 5 SErON HALL
CONST. LJ. 563 (1995).
203 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
204 State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
205 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1197 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206 The judicial integrity argument can, of course, cut the other way. The public often
perceives such a "technicality" as the exclusionary rule as hampering the search forjustice
and truth, rather than enhancing it, because truthful information is excluded on the basis
of the means of its receipt. SeeStone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1975) (citation omitted).
207 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 ("Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.").
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importance of Government abstention from illegal activity, whether by
police officers or by the judiciary, cannot be overestimated. As stated
20 8
by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Governmentis the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that
209
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
By limiting the exclusionary rule to deterrent purposes, the majority renders constitutional mandates regarding search and seizure
effectively meaningless. Only the judiciary is in the position to enforce constitutional dictates. By engaging in behavior which extends
Fourth Amendment violations into the courtroom, i.e., the admission
of evidence obtained from illegal police conduct, while simultaneously purporting to uphold the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
courts compromise their integrity. Although this paradoxical position
is somewhat inevitable given the numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the rule's existence should act as a limiting mechanism,
forcing courts to exclude illegally seized evidence except in a narrow
range of cases, namely for independent legal significance, because the
evidence could have or did come from a source other than the Fourth
Amendment violation, or to encourage the use of the warrant
10
process.2

See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) ("Courts which sit under our Constitution can
not and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions."); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) ("The tendency... to obtain conviction by means
of unlawful seizures... should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights."); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 923, 933 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence generally has utility in our legal system only in the context of a trial supervised

by a judge, it is apparent that the admission of illegally obtained evidence implicates
the same constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of that evidence. Indeed, by
admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary becomes a part of what is in fact a
single governmental action prohibited by the terms of the Amendment.
208 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
209 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
210 See supra notes 39-90 and accompanying text.
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EVEN IF DETERRENCE IS THE MAIN GOAL OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE, ADMITTING EVIDENCE IN EVANS ARTIFICIALLY
DISTINGUISHES ARRESTING POLICE OFFICERS FROM ALL
OTHER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, THEREBY LIMITING
THE DETERRENT POSSIBILITIES OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

In his concurrence, Justice Souter asked the essential question:
"how far [should] ... our very concept of deterrence by exclusion of
evidence . .. extend to the government as a whole, not merely the
police... [?]"211 Even if deterrence is the primary goal of the exclu-

sionary rule, limiting the application of the rule to arresting officers
ignores the realities of governmental interaction, and constrains the
rule's possible effects.
The Evans state courts made no factual finding of responsibility
for the clerical error which resulted in the Fourth Amendment viola-.
tion. 2 12 The source of error made very little difference to Chief Justice Rehnquist because he limits the targets of the rule to the arresting
officers. He concludes, a piori, that no deterrent purposes can be
served with respect to other officials involved in the transmission of
information regarding Evans' quashed warrant.2 13 By thus limiting
the availability of the exclusionary rule, Chief Justice Rehnquist constrains its other effective uses.
There are individuals involved in law enforcement other than the
arresting officers who have an investment, albeit somewhat more limited, in the outcome of criminal trials. Such interested individuals
may be non-arresting police officers, including those in charge of record-keeping, and court officials involved in criminal matters, to name
only a few. A broader application of the exclusionary rule could affect
2 14
the behavior of these individuals.
In a world of ever-proliferating technology, limiting the exclusionary rule to arresting police officers exposes citizens to greater and
more numerous Fourth Amendment violations.2 1 5 Additionally, it ignores the reality of how information is provided and shared by agencies other than the police.2 16 For example, the National Crime
211 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1195 (1995) (Souter, J., concurring).
212 Transcript, Evidentiary Hearing: Motion to Suppress, Joint Appendix, Arizona v. Ev-

ans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660).
213 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191.
214 See supra note 199.
215 This Note discusses but a few Fourth Amendment issues raised by new computer
technology. Application of traditional definitions of search and seizure to data kept and
shared by the computer is another such issue. For a discussion of some of these issues, see
Randolph S. Sergent, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81
VA. L. Ra,. 1181 (1995).
216 AsJustice Ginsburg states, "Court personnel and police officers are not compartmen-
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Information Center provides information regarding individuals
wanted for crimes to states and federal agencies.2 1 7 Over 16,000 agencies utilize this system to check for warrants.2 1 8 The individuals engaged in updating such a computer system have a stake in the
outcome of criminal trials, albeit on a different level than police officers, as do the thousands of agencies providing information to the
219
Center.
Had the Evans Court held that a non-judicial error is subject to
the exclusionary rule when the error results in a Fourth Amendment
violation, then local police stations would have greater incentive to
review their files; similarly, court employees would have motivation to
be accurate in recordkeeping. The outcome of criminal prosecutions
would be contingent on compliance with the proscriptions of the
Fourth Amendment. 22 0 Consequently, fewer lives would be disrupted
because of human error of government employees. The application
of the exclusionary rule to the state's agents would provide this practical incentive.
The Evans problem arose because the arresting officer in Evans
did not possess a physical warrant.2 2 1 Rather, he relied on his computer. 222 While police officers are free to utilize this convenient technology, doing so risks reliance upon invalid information.2 23 This risk
22 4
should be born by the sovereign.
talized actors. Instead, they serve to carry out the State's information-gathering objectives."
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1200 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217 The Department ofJustice runs the National Crime Information Center through the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Congress has called the National Crime Information
Center the "single most important avenue of cooperation among law enforcement agencies." National Law Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 612(a),
104 Stat. 4823 (1990).
218 Id.
219 See William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good FaithException to the Exclusionarj
Rule: Deregulatingthe Police and Derailingthe Law, 70 GEo. L. J. 365 (1981).
220 The deterrence rationale approaches the theoretical border of the rationale of constraining the sovereign. See supra part V.B.
221 Had the officer not relied on his computer, he would need a physical warrant, which
did not exist.
222 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1188 (1995).
223 The fact pattern of Evans is closer to others involving arrests as a result of invalid
information. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1971) (arresting officer relied
on radio bulletin issued by another department; the Court held that "an otherwise illegal
arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely
on fellow officers to make the arrest"); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232
(1985) (in dicta, the Court stated that reliance on another police department's "wanted"
flier was unreasonable when that flier was based on an absence of reasonable suspicion).
224 The sovereign should not only bear the cost in the interest ofjustice, but also because the government is the best cost avoider. The government is in the best position to
avoid illegal searches and seizures, as it can remedy the problem through due diligence,
proper record-keeping, and responsible training of government personnel. The individ-
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In the final analysis, it makes no difference to the individual
whose rights have been violated if the error resulting in the violation
occurred at a police station or a state agency. 225 The maintenance of
accurate and current information in government computers fundamentally preserves the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens. Even if
the exclusionary rule alms primarily at deterring future police misconduct, courts could pursue this goal by extending the exclusionary rule
beyond arresting police officers to include all police and non-judicial
personnel engaged in law enforcement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Arizona v. Evans, the Court concluded that admission of evidence seized incident to the execution of a non-existent arrest warrant as a result of a computer error was constitutional.
Evans was wrongly decided. The Court should have embraced a
broad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. First, the Court
should have factually distinguished United States v. Leon due to its focus
on the warrant process in concert with the fact that no warrant existed
in Evans. Second, the Court failed to acknowledge motivations for the
exclusionary rule other than deterrence, such as limiting governmental power, protecting individual privacy, and preserving the integrity
of the judiciary. Finally, even if the exclusionary rule serves only deterrence purposes, the Court limited the rule's potential deterrence
benefits by refusing to apply it to all governmental employees. Instead, the Court continues to chip away at the substance of essential
Fourth Amendment protections against illegal searches and seizures.
As a consequence of this decision, not only criminals, but also innocent citizens, will lose their Constitutionally guaranteed protections
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
HEATHER A. JACKSON

ual, on the other hand, regardless of any and all attempts to avoid illegal searches and
seizures, has no control whatsoever over the mistakes of government, be they mistakes of
court employees or police officers.
225 The fact that one's Fourth Amendment rights were violated is not the dispositive
issue, as judicial authorization "excuses" a violation by eliminating the exclusionary rule as
a remedy. Unlike the judicial authorization context, however, there is no legal reason for
distinguishing between the mistakes of an arresting officer and a clerical employee.

